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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In January  2013,  within  the  framework  of  a National  Inter-professional  Agreement  (NIA),
the French  government  required  all employers  (irrespective  of the  size  of  their  business)
to  offer  private  complementary  health  insurance  to their  employees  from  January  2016.
The  generalization  of  group  complementary  health  insurance  to all employees  will directly
affect  insurers,  employers  and  employees,  as  well  as individuals  not  directly  concerned
(students,  retirees,  unemployed  and  civil servants).  In this  paper,  we  present  the  issues
raised by  this  regulation,  the  expected  consequences  and the  current  debate  around  this
reform.  In particular,  we  argue that  this  reform  may  have  adverse  effects  on equity  of access
to  complementary  health  insurance  in France,  since  the risk  structure  of the  market  for
individual  health  insurance  will  change,  potentially  increasing  inequalities  between  wage-
earners and others.  Moreover,  tax exemptions  given  to  group  contracts  are  problematic
because  public  funds  used  to support  these  contracts  can  be  higher  at individual  level  for
high-salary  individuals  than  those  allocated  to  improve  access  for the  poorest.  In  response
to the  criticism  and  with  the  aim  of ensuring  equity  in  the  system,  the  government  decided
to  reconsider  some  of  the  ﬁscal  advantages  given  to  group  contracts,  to enhance  programs
and  aids  dedicated  to the  poorest  and  to redeﬁne  an overall  context  of  incentives.
©  2015  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC
Y-NC-NB
. Policy background: the role of private health
nsurance in France
In France, statutory health insurance (SHI) is compul-
ory and uniform for all individuals living legally in the
erritory. Created in 1945 under the Bismarckian prin-
iples, SHI was extended to all legal residents in 2000
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(universal health insurance coverage, CMU) and since 1991,
an income tax has been added to social contributions to
fund the French social security (that accounts for 20% of its
resources in 2012). Moreover, a program (“affection longue
durée”, ALD) is dedicated to patients with severe diseases
(listed by the French National Authority for Health) to fully
compensate their costs of care associated only to their
severe disease on the basis of regulated prices. SHI may  be
considered as a mechanism of solidarity between healthy
and sick and between rich and poor.
However, even though SHI covers a broad range of
care, patients are left with copayments calculated as per-
centages of the regulated prices (30% of doctors’ care,
35/65% of drugs, etc.). Although the share of health expen-
diture ﬁnanced by SHI only declined slightly between
2006 and 2013 (from 78.2% to 77.4%), for some health
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ion of ﬁnFig. 1. Distribution and evolut
services, private funding (including both complementary
health insurance reimbursements and households out of
pocket) has increased steadily (Fig. 1). Indeed, the rise
in the private funding share is mainly explained by the
increase in extra-billings and the deregulation of prices
of products that are poorly covered by the SHI (opti-
cal, dental, etc.). Moreover, successive reforms have led
to a decrease in SHI reimbursement rates for some pop-
ulations and/or some types of care (increases in daily
hospital copayment, drugs no longer reimbursed, etc.)
while health care needs have increased (Fig. 1). However,
the apparent stability of the public funding share hides
an increase in spread rates of copayment depending on
health status through the ALD program: for instance in
2010, while the SHI funding share was on average 76.1%,
it was respectively 62.3% for non-ALD and 88.6% for ALD
insureds.ancing of health expenditure.
In 2013, the per capita average consumption of care
reaches D 2843 for a total consumption of D 186.7 billion;
the average private funding share (22.6%) corresponds to
D 643 per capita which is ﬁnanced by private insurance for
D 393 and directly by individuals for D 250 (8.8%). Possess-
ing a complementary health insurance (CHI) contract that
compensates at least for co-payments and sometimes for
extra billing has become a key determinant to access to
health care. In 2010, nearly 96% of individuals owned a CHI
contract.
In 2014, 7.4% of those covered by CHI beneﬁt from a
public program providing a free CHI contract to the poo-
rest (“complementary universal health coverage”, CMU-C).
Individuals above the CMU-C ceiling can get a voucher
to partially fund a CHI premium (“aide complémentaire
santé”,  ACS). Except for this poorest part of the popula-
tion, the CHI contracts are purchased either individually or
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ollectively through employer-sponsored contracts. Prices
nd coverage vary signiﬁcantly. Individual contracts are
unded entirely by the insured himself while for group con-
racts, insurance premium and coverage are negotiated by
he employer who usually at least partially paid the pre-
ium and who beneﬁt from tax cuts.
In January 2013, in the framework of a National Inter-
rofessional Agreement (NIA), the government required all
mployers (irrespective of the size of their business) to offer
HI to their employees. This article presents the rationale
nd the debates of this reform and discusses its implica-
ions for all stakeholders and for the efﬁciency in the French
ealth system. First, we describe the French private insur-
nce market. Second, we  present the implications of NIA
oncerning the health insurance market. Then, we discuss
he expected consequences and the current issues.
. Private insurance market
.1. Types of insurers
Three types of insurers compete in the French health
nsurance market: non-proﬁt mutual insurance companies
mutuelles) that predate the social security system and have
raditionally dominated the market [2], non-proﬁt provi-
ent institutions, and private for-proﬁt insurance companies.
Mutuelles historically put emphasis on solidarity and
social responsibility; health insurance is their main line of
business, representing more than 80% of their turnover.
In 2013, the 480 mutuelles (1359 in 2002) accounted for
54% (60% in 2002) of CHI turnover. They cover about two
thirds of those privately insured (38 million individuals).
The enrolment is split between employer-sponsored
(roughly 27% of their turnover in 2010) and individual
contracts [3].
Provident institutions, developed in the wake of the
social security system, initially to manage retirement
schemes, are jointly managed by representatives of
employers and employees. They diversiﬁed their activ-
ities in the 1980s to provide health insurance. Today, 28
provident institutions (52 in 2002) cover about 11% of the
privately insured (6.8 million individuals) and account
for 18% of CHI turnover. Health care represented 47% of
their activities in 2012, and group contracts represented
84% of their turnover in 2010 [4,5].
Ninety-six insurance companies (120 in 2002) compete
in the market for the remaining 28% of CHI turnover
in 2013. Health remains a marginal line of their busi-
ness (between 7% and 13%) [5]. Enrolment is again split
between individual and employer-sponsored contracts
(representing 42% of their health turnover in 2010).
During the last decades, the mutuelles’  market share
eclined from 35.1% in 2006 to 32.2% in 2013 (Fig. 2) to
he beneﬁt of insurance companies (14% to 17.4%). These
hanges in the CHI market are partly due to the Euro-
ean prudential insurance activities framework that was
olled out over the past decades to all insurers, regardless of
heir status. EU rules applied to insurance companies from
973, then to provident institutions from 1994 and ﬁnallyFig. 2. Breakdown of private ﬁnancing of health care spending.
to mutuelles from 2001. As a consequence, the French tax
regime on insurance policies has been harmonized across
insurers: before 2002, mutuelles and provident institutions
had been exempted from a speciﬁc tax on insurance poli-
cies. This was  abolished and replaced by an exemption
based on the type of contract: the “responsible contract”
that encourages the compliance with the gatekeeping path-
way and does not reimburse nonrefundable franchises.
Such a contract has to reimburse at least: ﬁrst, the overall
copayment based on ofﬁcial tariffs for physicians’ consulta-
tions and for the price of medical biology examinations and
second, the copayment of at least two preventive services.
2.2. Individual, group contracts and public aids
The health insurance market is split into two types of
contracts: employer-sponsored (group) contracts and indi-
vidual contracts directly bought by the insured.
Employers are not required but incentivized to estab-
lish a group contract (Table 1). Since 1985, group contracts
have beneﬁted from tax and social contribution exemp-
tions: employers are exempted from social contributions
on their participation to the premium and employees are
exempted from income tax on the total CHI premium (their
contribution and the employer’s). Since 2009, these tax and
social contribution exemptions are restricted to compul-
sory contracts for employees (78%) for which the employer
contributes to the premium [7]. While 76% of employ-
ees beneﬁt from group contracts in 2009, they are mostly
provided in large companies and are usually much more
advantageous for given beneﬁts than individuals ones [1].
The Government has implemented several schemes or
aids to promote individual access to CHI for the low income
groups (CMU-C and ACS) and for self-employed and civil
servants (Table 1). Early 2014 almost 5 million individ-
uals beneﬁted from the CMU-C contract which provides
full coverage (based on regulated prices) [10]. In particu-
lar, it prohibits physicians from charging extra fees, allows
patients to make no cash advance for the cost of care, and
ﬁnally provides dental and optical packages. Eligibility for
CMU-C is mainly conditional on resources that must be well
below the poverty line. The ACS was  introduced in 2004 to
help individuals whose income is slightly above the CMU-C
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Table 1
Comparison of public aids granted to different CHI responsible contracts.
CHI group contracts (compulsory)a Self-employed CHI contractsb Civil servants CMU-C ACS Total
Aids (millions of D ) 2990 215 50 1632 157 5044
Aid  per CHI contract (D ) 226 260 15 450
Aid  per individual (D ) 370 270
HCAAM, 18/07/2013 (la Généralisation de la couverture complémentaire en santé) (page 64).
Note:  Tax exemption on insurance contracts is not included in the calculations as it is common to all “responsible CHI contracts” whatever the type of both
subscriber and private insurer.
nce 200
d self-ema Facultative group contracts have not beneﬁted from any public aid si
b Since 1994, the “Loi Madelin” allows artisans, traders, industrialists an
income.
ceiling (below 135% of the CMU-C threshold) to pay the CHI
premium. Since 2014, consultations for ACS patients who
follow the coordinated care pathway cannot be charged
extra fees. Finally, the public aids are very different depend-
ing on the type of individual and the type of contract
(Table 1). While the poorest individuals are most supported
(D 370 per CMU-C beneﬁciary), group contracts are sup-
ported to the tune of about D 230 per year per contract,
representing on average a lower aid per capita depending
on the number of beneﬁciaries per contract. In addition,
the average public aid masks signiﬁcant disparities based
on income, because of the progressivity of the income tax.
As an example, for a non-taxable employee, the public aid
corresponds to the social exemption for employer partici-
pation, an annual amount of approximately D 110, while for
an employee whose taxable income per share is between
70,830 and D 150,000, the public aid reaches about D 440.
3. Agreement on the labor market ﬂexibility with
strong impact on the health insurance market
3.1. Description of the NIA measures concerning CHI
The NIA is an agreement signed in January 2013 by
representatives of employers and employees following a
government supported process to improve the competi-
tiveness of French ﬁrms providing more ﬂexibility in the
labor market: it relaxes certain constraints on employers
(i.e. layoffs) and in return, promotes access to group CHI.
• The NIA requires all employers, regardless of the
company size, to half fund a compulsory group CHI
from 1 January 2016. Negotiations started in spring
2013 and take place at the industry level between
employer/employee representatives and private insur-
ers. Where successful, prices and coverage are guaran-
teed for any contracting company in the business sector
(regardless of its size). Where they have failed by July
2014, negotiations at company level will be carried out.
Without being yet able to identify industries for which
negotiations have been concluded, a decree was issued in
the Ofﬁcial journal to establish the minimal set of beneﬁts
in case negotiations failed: the “minimal contract” must
at least reimburse the entire SHI copayment for medical
consultations, drugs and hospital care excluding nonre-
fundable franchises (in respect of the care pathway). For
optics and dental care, group contracts will also have to
provide minimum packages [11].9.
ployed persons to deduct health insurance premiums from their taxable
• When experiencing unemployment, previously collec-
tively insured individuals will beneﬁt from the contract
for up to 12 months instead of 9 previously.
3.2. Stakeholder positions
All partners representing employers have signed the
agreement while two  (out of ﬁve) trade unions were
opposed because of measures introducing more ﬂexibility
on employment. The government wants to apply the NIA
quickly to promote employment. The agreement has been
translated into a draft law approved by Parliament in May
2013.
4. The expected consequences of the NIA
4.1. For employees
According to the HCAAM (high council for the future
of public health insurance), the NIA will allow 4.4 million
employees (covered by an individual CHI or without) to
access to a group CHI contract [8]. Given the low num-
ber of employees without any CHI (about 400,000), this
agreement will mainly change the type of coverage from
individual to group CHI and most often change the insurer.
Note that a decree issued recently (July 2014) estab-
lished the conditions under which individuals insured by
state sponsored individual CHI (CMU-C and ACS) may
be exempted to enroll to a compulsory group CHI con-
tract.
The NIA also concerns nearly 2 million employees pro-
tected by the group contract of their spouse. Indeed, most
of them will have to subscribe a group contract through
their own  employer. Even if these changes could be neu-
tral for the total number of insureds covered by a group
contract, this might not be neutral for individuals in terms
of premium paid. Otherwise, some employees may  have to
switch from an individual contract tailored to their pre-
ferences to a less appropriate collective one in terms of
propensity to pay for health coverage.
4.2. For employers
Not all employers face the same difﬁculties: while
most large companies already offer CHI to their employ-
ees, it is much less common for small and medium ﬁrms.
Although small companies are the main target of this
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argaining power, lower representation of social partners,
mall ﬁnancial margins). As a result, the implementation of
he NIA can adversely affect the competitiveness of small
ompanies.
.3. For private health insurers
Mutuelles,  provident institutions and insurance compa-
ies do not share the same situation. Overall, mutuelles have
uch more to lose in terms of market share than others
ecause their turnover is more concentrated on the indi-
idual market. Employees with an individual contract will
witch to a group contract; globally this amounts to a trans-
er of around D 35.5 billion. Because mutuelles offer a higher
evel of intergenerational solidarity [1] they could be forced
o increase their tariffs.
. The current debates
.1. Terms and conditions of tax cuts
Since 2006, tax incentives target both the nature (col-
ective), the content of CHI contracts and the fact that the
ndividual premium has to be independent of the individ-
al state of health of insureds (“responsible contracts”). In
013, the “responsible contracts” is still deﬁned as a con-
ract that encourages the compliance with the gatekeeping
athway and does not reimburse nonrefundable franchises
ut has to offer higher packages for dental and optical care.
his contract beneﬁted from a reduced tax on insurance
roducts of 7% compared with 14% for contracts that do not
eet the speciﬁcations. The “responsible contracts” have
 94% market share: meeting the speciﬁcations was quite
asy, most importantly tax incentives were effective. While
n 2004, “responsible contracts” were fully exempted (com-
ared with 7% for other contracts), the continuing transfer
f funding from government to private health insurers for
ubsidized contracts (CMU-C and ACS) led to enhance all
axes even so the incentive tax rates gap has been main-
ained [12].
Today, the decree redeﬁning the speciﬁcations of
responsible contracts” in the context of the NIA is very
uch expected (early October 2014) to understand the
verall coherence of the reform. Indeed, the initial deﬁni-
ion of “responsible contracts” raised questions in the NIA
ontext: the group contracts supported by the government
hrough tax cuts are not really responsible in that they
upport virtually unlimited extra billing and/or provided
ompensations for ineffective drugs while being consid-
red “responsible”. This draft decree has been published:
n addition to the coverage provided in the “minimum con-
ract” that employers will have to offer to their employees
with more or less the same minimal compensations), the
responsible contracts” ﬁrst expand some coverage obliga-
ions (hospital copayment for unlimited period) and second
rovide ceilings for reimbursements especially for optics
nd for doctors’ extra fees. The National Union of CHI insur-
rs (Unocam) issued a negative opinion on the former
xplaining that expanding coverage obligations represents
 serious risk of an increase in CHI premium [11].y 119 (2015) 111–116 115
While the speciﬁcations concerns all CHI contracts, the
ﬁscal exemption dedicated to group CHI contracts have
also been hotly debated in the deteriorating economic
environment. Indeed, these debates take a new dimension
as ﬁscal exemptions are estimated to rise by D 2 billion
with the reform [8] while their relevance appears not to
comply with redistribution goals. For instance, for an
employee whose taxable income per share is between
D 70,830 and D 150,000, the marginal tax rate is 41%, total
public support is D 440, more than for the working poor
under the ACS (the amount is D 200 for a person 16–49
years and D 350 for a person between 50 and 59 years) or
a beneﬁciary of the CMU-C. As a result, the tax exemption
granted to employees on the employer’s contribution of the
premium was  removed in December 2013. The argument
given by the government is that the employer contribution
is comparable to a beneﬁt in kind and thus to an addi-
tional taxable salary. The expected revenue for the ﬁscal
administration is evaluated in 2014, at D 960 million [13].
5.2. Inequalities on the CHI market
Although the generalization of compulsory group con-
tracts should reduce inequalities in access to CHI for
wage-earners, it is still difﬁcult to predict how inequalities
will vary between employees and all other individuals.
Individual CHI contracts, whether publicly aided (CMU-
C or ACS) or not, will concern self-employed individuals,
civil servants, students, precarious workers, long-term
unemployed, some inactive persons and a majority of
retired persons. This population is composed of “good”
risks and of “bad risks” such that it is difﬁcult to state how
the risk structure of the individual CHI market will evolve
and whether this will result in an increase in premiums
rates.
Since July 2013, the government seems to prioritize the
poorest: the ceilings to beneﬁt from CMU-C or ACS were
revised upwards and since January 2014, health profession-
als can no longer apply extra fees to the ACS’s beneﬁciaries.
In addition, the decrees issued in 2014 allow these ben-
eﬁciaries to be exempted from compulsory adherence to
group CHI contract to still beneﬁt from all of their advan-
tages.
6. Conclusion
Because the NIA was adopted on the sidelines of a
global labor agreement, it focused on reducing inequal-
ities between different groups of employees. However,
it might increase inequalities between wage-earners and
others (unemployed, civil servants, self-employed persons,
retirees and students) and in any case, it will affect the CHI
market as a whole.
Indeed, it is not clear that by further strengthening the
role of the private health insurance, the NIA will increase or
reduce the problem of adverse selection. A priori, consid-
ering employees, one might think that adverse selection
should play a lower role: to beneﬁt from the reduced tax
on insurance, the group CHI contracts must be compulsory.
However, the reform might have adverse consequences
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adjust premiums in order to account for the loss of employ-
ees from the risk-pool. In particular, Mutuelles are likely to
lose a high number of employees, and consequently, will
have to increase premiums for the elderly. The deﬁnition of
a renewed bill of speciﬁcations for “responsible contracts”
could at least prevent insurers to offer too-poor contracts;
but it is hard to say if the price of these contracts will be
accessible.
Finally, some point out that the NIA may  in future favor
the disengagement of the SHI and a shift to the private
health insurance, leading to unequal access to care, which
the government would try to address through public pro-
grams or aids dedicated to the poorest.
Some others ﬁnd that by supporting the NIA, the gov-
ernment has tried to reduce households’ out-of-pockets in
a context of strong limitation of public spending: through
“responsible contracts” again, the selection of insureds is
supposed to be strongly limited; compared to individual
CHI contracts, collective ones that provide a higher level of
pooling were encouraged; speciﬁc programs and aids for
the poorest households were reinforced and enlarged.
These changes are so important that the question of the
complementarity of public and private health insurances
is again at the heart of the debate. In fact, to improve the
efﬁciency of the system, more coordination and common
strategies between SHI and CHI would be needed [9]. A
reform that only focuses on a segment (group contracts)
of a segment (CHI) of the system is likely to create adverse
effects in other areas.Conﬂict of interest
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